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We investigate how the exchange rate regime influences economic linkages across 
countries.  We divide the exchange rate regime into three classifications: currency union, 
peg and floating exchange rates. Unlike most studies solely focusing on the relationship 
between anchor and client countries, the exchange rate regime between any two countries 
is inferred based on their relationship to the common anchor currency. Then we 
empirically explore how the various exchange rate regimes impact on bilateral trade, 
output co-movement and financial integration.  Financial integration is measured by the 
degree of risk sharing reflected in consumption co-movement relative to output co-
movement.  We find that, while currency union has the greatest effect, the peg regime 
also significantly boosts trade.  We also find that, while the peg regime contributes to 
both output and consumption co-movements, the currency union strengthens only 
consumption co-movement and possibly lowers output co-movement.  These findings are 
interpreted that the currency union, the strictest form of pegged regimes, leads to higher 
industry specialization and better risk sharing opportunities than the less strict peg regime.  
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 1. Introduction  
 
 
One of the most important issues in international economics is to understand how 
a choice of exchange rate regimes affects on macroeconomic performance of an 
economy.
1  As Mussa (1986) and many others emphasize, a significant difference arises 
that the real exchange rate as well as the nominal exchange rate is much more volatile 
under the floating regime.
2  Since then, however, no consensus is established about other 
differences.  Notably, Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Flood and Rose (1995) find that 
no other macro variables including growth, inflation, business cycles and trade are 
significantly different across regimes. 
   Occasionally, however, actual practices of exchange rate policies differ from what 
the countries publicly commit to behave.  A different view emerges, then, as studies 
distinguish between de jure regimes based on the publicly stated commitment and de 
facto regimes based on the actual behavior of the exchange rate.  For example, Ghosh et 
al. (2002), by employing both de jure and de facto classifications, find stronger evidence 
from de facto classifications that inflation is both lower and stable but the real output is 
more volatile under the fixed exchange regime. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzengger (2004) also 
use the de facto classification, which is constructed by statistical techniques, and find that 
fixed exchange rate regimes are associated with slower growth and higher output 
volatility.  Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) advance one step further and emphasize the 
importance of the market based parallel exchange rates instead of the official exchange 
rates.  When there are multiple exchange rates operating, exchange rates in the parallel 
market tend to more closely reflect market-determined exchange rates. By focusing on 
the actual behavior in the parallel market, they suggest that different exchange regimes 
lead to different economic performances.  
While a number of studies focus on performance of a single economy, more 
emphasis has recently been put on understanding the influences of exchange rate regimes 
on the linkages between two economies.  In fact, different performance of a single 
                                                 
1 Analysis of this issue traces back to Friedman (1953), who argued for the flexible exchange rate regime 
over the fixed exchange rate regime on the grounds that the former provides greater insulation from foreign 
shocks.  Later, Mundell has produced a series of papers (1960, 1961) investigating the same issue. 
2 Mussa (1986) finds that the real exchange rate is between three and six times more variable under floating 
than under fixed rates independently of the underlying shocks. economy may be due to different economic linkages implicated by different exchange 
rate regimes.  For example, different exchange regimes generate a different degree of 
trade integration and thus in turn lead to different growth performance and business cycle 
co-movement. Especially the currency union, the extreme case of fixed exchange rate 
regimes, is extensively analyzed in this regard. Rose (2000) pioneered empirical research 
on currency unions by finding a huge impact of currency unions on trade.
3 Subsequently, 
there have been a vast number of studies made to check robustness of his finding.
4 
Frankel and Rose (2002) also show that currency unions, by increasing trade, contribute 
significantly to output growth of member countries.  In addition, Frankel and Rose (1998) 
argue that increased trade is a major channel by which business cycles are more 
synchronized across countries.
5 
Rose and Engle (2002) extend the previous analyses to show how currency unions 
have influences on other bilateral integrations.  They show that members of currency 
unions are more integrated in other aspects as well: the real exchange rates are less 
volatile and business cycles are more synchronized across currency union member 
countries than across countries with sovereign monies.   
This line of empirical studies that investigate the economic effects of exchange 
rate regimes encounters standard endogeneity problems. The choice of exchange rate 
regimes itself may not be exogenous to the outcome variable under investigation. For 
example, a country is more likely to join a currency union when it expects an increase in 
trade with other member countries. In this case, the causality runs in the opposite 
direction: more trade leads to stricter exchange rate regimes. It is also plausible that the 
choice of exchange rate regime reflects any omitted characteristics that influence the 
economic outcome. Then, the OLS estimates may not reveal the true effect of exchange 
rate regimes on economic outcomes.   
                                                 
3 According to his empirical analysis, membership in a currency union, ceteris paribus, more than triples 
bilateral trade among member countries. 
4 In general, however, the subsequent studies made by Rose and his co-authors continue to show that the 
impact of currency unions on the volume of trade is significantly large.  See Rose (2004) for the review. 
5 Theoretically, increased trade per se can lead either to more or to less synchronization depending on 
whether it strengthens industry specialization or not.  Recently Shin and Wang (2004) find that intra-
industry trade is the major channel by which the business cycle of Asian countries become synchronized , 
although increased trade itself does not necessarily lead to more synchronization. 
 Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyno (2002) and Tenreyro and Barro (2003) try to get 
around the endogeineity issue by developing a new instrumental-variable (IV) approach 
in estimating the effects of currency unions. They construct an IV by exploiting the 
independent decisions of a pair of countries to peg their currencies to a third currency. 
They estimate the joint probability that two countries use the same currency of a main 
anchor country.  This likelihood, which is independent of the bilateral links between two 
client countries, is used as an instrument for the currency union dummy in the regressions. 
Their IV results confirm the previous findings that currency unions significantly increase 
bilateral trade and price co-movement, but, unlike the finding of Rose and Engle, 
decrease the extent of output co-movement.  
In this paper we investigate how the choice of exchange rate regimes influences 
on the economic linkages between countries by extending the instrumental variable 
methodology to avoid the endogeneity problem.  Differently from the previous studies, 
we broaden our analyses to cover not just currency unions but also other exchange 
regimes.
6  Specifically we divide the exchange regimes into three classifications: 
currency unions, peg and floating exchange rates.  Then we analyze how the various 
exchange rate regimes impact on the bilateral trade, real GDP co-movement and financial 
integration.  Especially the financial integration is measured by the extent of risk sharing 
reflected in consumption co-movement relative to output co-movement.   
We find that after two countries peg their currencies to the same anchor currency, 
irrespective of the particular form of pegging, their bilateral trade increases considerably. 
Especially, currency union, the strictest form of pegged exchange rates, has the largest 
trade-creation effect. The empirical results suggest that low exchange rate variability 
between two countries with pegged exchange rate arrangements helps them trade more.  
They further suggest that the complete elimination of the exchange rate variability under 
currency union works better than just low variability under the peg regime. 
On output co-movement, however, only the peg regime leads to a significantly 
positive impact.  Currency unions may even make output co-movement lower.
7  We also 
                                                 
6 Recently Klein and Shambaugh (2004) also extend the analyses to the role fixed exchange rates on trade 
and find a large and significant effect on bilateral trade between an anchor country and a country that pegs 
to it.   
7 Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004) also show that countries belonging to a currency union do not have find that the peg regime strengthens consumption co-movement in a similar magnitude.  
In contrast, currency union always enhances consumption co-movement more than output 
co-movement.   
Given that risk sharing is enhanced only when the extent of consumption co-
movement is more strengthened than that of output co-movement, only currency union 
shows evidence of enhanced risk sharing.  Since both output and consumption co-
movements increase by about the same magnitude under the peg regime, we conclude 
that the peg regime does not enhance risk sharing.  This suggests that financial integration 
is not likely further deepened even if two countries form a peg relationship.  Financial 
integration is likely to be reinforced only under currency union.
8  Since financial 
integration promotes industry specialization, currency union may also lead low output co-
movement across countries.
9 
The remainder of the paper follows in five sections.  In section 2, we illustrate 
classification of exchange rate regimes and the data used in the empirical analyses.  
Section 3 discusses the endogeneity issue with respect to the choice of the regimes and 
introduces ways to get around the problem.  Sections 4 and 5 present and discuss the 
main empirical estimation results on the effects of the exchange rate regimes on the 
bilateral trade and on output and consumption co-movements respectively.  Concluding 
remarks follow in Section 6.  
 
2. The Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Other Data 
 
To investigate the impact of exchange rate regimes on economic linkages, we 
should make a decision in advance on how we classify the exchange rate regimes. A 
                                                                                                                                                   
significantly more highly correlated business cycles than countries that do not share a common currency. 
8 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) show that correlations between current account positions and per capita 
incomes increase more for future European Monetary Union (EMU) countries in 1990s, suggesting that 
monetary integration enhanced financial integration.  Spiegel (2004) also argues that overall international 
borrowing is facilitated by the creation of monetary union based on the evidence from Portugal’s Accession 
to the EMU.   
9 The impact of financial integration on industry specialization is well documented in the literature.  
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorenson and Yosha (2003) show that risk sharing significantly promotes industry 
specialization.  Heathcote and Perri (2002) also argue that the U.S. business cycle has become increasingly 
idiosyncratic over the past 30 years due to the increasing share of international assets held in the U.S.  
However Imbs (2004) shows that, while financial integration enhances specialization, it may lead to more 
synchronization of outputs across countries due to correlated capital flows.  number of previous studies have relied on the official IMF classifications of exchange 
rate regimes published in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions.  The IMF classifications rely exclusively on each government’s 
own declaration of its exchange rate regime. But, there exist conflicts between the 
exchange rate regime that often prevails de jure and the way that exchange rate policy is 
conducted de facto. For example, a regime that was classified as floating (independently 
or managed) were often a de facto peg or crawling peg, displaying so-called ‘fear of 
floating’(Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).  
A number of recent studies have attempted to construct de facto classifications of 
exchange rate regimes. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzengger (2004) use statistical method based 
on data on the volatility of nominal exchange rates and the volatility of international 
reserves. They classify exchange rate regimes for all IMF member countries over the 
period of 1974-2000 into four categories— flexible, dirty float, crawling peg, and fixed. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) advance one step further and use a new database on parallel 
market exchange rates as well as chronologies of the exchange rate history to construct a 
de facto classification. 
The de facto classification has a clear advantage that it reflects the actual behavior 
of the exchange rate, but a possibility still remains that the observed behavior of 
exchange rates is misleading. For example, stable nominal exchange rates may result 
from an absence of shocks, not from active offsetting policy actions.  However, 
increasing evidence of inconsistencies between actual policies and the commitment 
suggests that the de jure classification should warrant economically more meaningful 
analyses.  Henceforth, for our paper, we follow the de facto classification of exchange 
rate regimes made by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).  
Based on a broad variety of descriptive statistics and chronologies, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) assess the way countries actually conduct exchange rate policy, and 
reclassify exchange rate regimes for 153 countries at 14 fine categories. They also divide 
regimes in five “coarse grid”— peg, limited flexibility, managed floating, freely floating, 
and freely falling. The “freely falling” is a category that includes countries whose twelve-
month rate of inflation is above 40 percent. We aggregate the 14 fine categories into three  
broad groups: currency union, peg (exclusive of currency union), and floating.  A currency union regime includes the countries that have no separate legal tender.
10 A 
floating regime includes managed floating, freely floating and freely falling. A ‘peg’ 
includes diverse forms of pegging systems, ranging from a currency board arrangement to 
a moving band system.
11 
We infer the exchange rate regime between any two countries based on their 
relationship with an anchor currency. If the two countries have their currencies pegged 
simultaneously to the same anchor currency, we classify their exchange rate arrangement 
as a peg. If one country pegs its currency and the other floats, their relationship is 
classified as a float. Hence, this classification method tends to increase the cases of 
floating exchange rate regimes. 
Most other data comes from Glick and Rose (2002), which cover 186 countries 
from 1948 to 1997.  These include the bilateral trade data and other control variables 
related to various measures of distance and size used in a standard gravity equation. Since 
the Bretton Woods System constrained most countries to maintain the fixed exchange 
rate until the early 1970s, our data set starts from 1974. Just simply juxtaposing the fixed 
exchange rate era under the Bretton Woods System with the floating exchange rate 
regimes thereafter can be misleading because different exchange rate regimes could 
behave differently because they faced different shocks. We have added output and 
consumption data to the Glick-Rose data set.  We have first used the Penn World Table
12 
and complement the missing data using the World Development Indicator
13.  
                                                 
10 We extend the Reinhart and Rogoff data to include all currency union observations defined in Glick and 
Rose (2002).  
11 In the preliminary draft, we have used four-regimes classifications- currency union, strong peg (exclusive 
of currency union), weak peg, and floating- by dividing ‘peg’ regimes into two sub-groups. We have 
classified the exchange rate arrangements as a strong-peg regime in which a country defends its exchange 
rate within a narrow margin of 2% around a fixed rate.  This approach is also pursued in Shin and Lee 
(2004) that focus on East Asian countries.  We do not find much significant differences between strong peg 
and weak peg regimes in terms of our empirical results. Anyway, the dividing line between a strong-peg 
and a week peg is not unambiguous.  
12 Penn World Table Version 6.1 is developed by Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, , Center 
for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002. 
13 Real output and consumption are based on constant local currency unit.  For the Penn World Data, we 
have summed up consumption, investment, government expenditure and exports and subtracted imports 
using the national account. The estimations will use annual data consisting of 119,677 country pairs in total.
14 
The data set has a feature of panel structure consisting of 119,677 annual observations 
clustered by 8,580 country pair groups over time.  The number of observations varies per 
year. Summary statistics for the data used in estimation is presented in Table 1 (a). Of all 
observations, 1,037 country-pairs (about 0.9 percent) belong to a currency union, 19,101 
country pairs (about 16.0 percent) belong to a peg.  Thus, roughly 17 percent of all 
observations belong to various types of pegging exchange rate arrangements, and the rest 
belong to a float. 
 
 
    3. Endogeneity of Exchange Rate Regime Choice 
 
The implicit assumption in most empirical approaches is that the choice of 
exchange rate regimes is exogenous. But, countries may expect an increase in trade 
between them, and thereby simply adopt a peg system to facilitate this. Countries that 
have a higher degree of business cycle synchronizations are more likely to adopt pegging 
regime because the loss of independent monetary policy would become less costly. Then, 
the positive effect of pegs on trade or output co-movements may reflect reverse causality. 
This paper attempts to control for the endogeneity problem in two ways.  First, we 
have inferred the exchange rate regime between two countries based on their relationship 
to a common anchor currency. By utilizing this triangular relationship of two countries to 
a common anchor, we can lessen the endogeneity problem.  Focusing on the bilateral 
relationship between only these non-anchor pairs allows the severity of the endogeneity 
problem to be substantially lowered because the peg relationship between these pairs is a 
byproduct of each country’s decision to peg to a common anchor. While each country’s 
decision to peg to the common anchor can reflect the endogeneity nature, this is less so 
for the relationship between these non-anchor pairs.
15  
                                                 
14 This data set is based on trade regression in section 4 that also has instrumental variables. The 
regressions on output and consumption co-movements lose some observations due to the lack of 
consumption and output data. 
15 This argument suffers from criticism made by Meissner and Oomes (2004) that emphasize the network 
externality: the benefits of using a particular anchor increase with the amount of trade with countries that 
use the same anchor.  Summary statistics for this subsample exclusive of anchor countries is presented 
in Table 1 (b). This data set has a feature of panel structure consisting of 106,165 annual 
observations clustered by 7,882 country pair groups over time. Of all observations, 950 
country-pairs (about 0.9 percent) belong to a currency union, 17,072 country pairs (about 
16.1 percent) belong to a peg.  
Second, we follow the instrumental variable (IV) approach in Alesina, Barro, and 
Tenreyno (2002) and Tenreyro and Barro (2003). The instrumental variables used in 
these studies also exploit the triangular relationship of pairs, but utilize all their 
relationships with any potential anchor country. As an example, consider two countries 
that peg their currencies to a currency of an anchor country. The factors driving the 
decision of a client country to peg its currency to the anchor can be considered as 
independent of the bilateral links between the two clients. Thus, the idea is that by 
exploiting the relation with the anchor, we can construct an instrument that eliminates the 
endogeneity bias.  
In order to separate out the relation with the anchor, we construct the probability 
that a client country pegs its currency to a potential anchor. We consider five potential 
anchors including France, Germany, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. According to Reinhart and Rogoff’s classification, these five countries’ currencies 
have served as main nominal anchors to other countries’ currencies.
16   
Let’s denote the estimated probability that client i pegs its currency to that of 
anchor k (among the five candidates) at time t by p(i,k,t). Then, the probability that two 
clients i and j, independently, adopt a same anchor currency is calculated by the sum of 
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The variable P(i,j,t) can be used as an instrument for a peg regime dummy.  
                                                 
16 Other anchor currencies include Australian dollar for some of the Pacific islands countries, and Indian 
rupee for Bhutan. These observations are not in our sample.  In order to construct the estimated probability, Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro 
(2002), Tenreyro and Barro (2003), and Tenreyro (2003) use a logit regression assuming 
that a country’s decision is binary outcomes- adopts as its legal tender (or pegs its 
currency to) an anchor’s currency or not. We extend the logit model for binary outcomes 
to the multinomial logit model in which the country can choose one exchange rate regime 
among three alternatives such as currency union, peg, and float. 
 The multinomial logit regression includes the income and sizes of potential 
clients and anchors, as well as various measures of distance between them as 
determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime. These variables are implied as the 
main determinants of regime choice by the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA). 
Modern discussions of exchange regime choice also identify other important factors such 
as the extent of real shocks, the degree of commitment to monetary stability, and the level 
of foreign-denominated liabilities (see the discussions in Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and 
Reggio, 2002 and Rogoff et al., 2004). We have also tried to add some of these measures 
as explanatory variables. But, the inclusion of these additional variables makes the 
sample size shrink substantially, so for the purpose of IV construction, we stick to the 
OCA characteristics variables only.
17   
The results of the multinomial logit regressions are in the Appendix Table. The 
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients should be interpreted as the effect of each 
explanatory variable on the probability of adopting each peg regime over the floating 
regime. For example, the estimated coefficient on log of distance (-4.96, s.e.=1.13) 
implies that an increase in distance between a client and an anchor by one unit reduces 
the ‘log-odds’ between currency union and floating by 4.96.  
The result is broadly consistent with the finding of Tenreyro and Barro (2003) on 
currency unions: the probability of a country’s using the currency of one of the main 
anchors or adopting other forms of pegs increases when i) the client is geographically 
closer to the anchor, ii) the client was a former colony of the anchor country, iii) the 
anchor is richer, iv) the anchor and client belong to a common regional trade arrangement, 
and v) they speak the same language. Interestingly, an increase in the client’s per capita 
                                                 
17 Our main results of the IV regressions for bilateral trade, output and consumption co-movements do not 
change qualitatively when we use IVs constructed from the specifications that include the additional 
variables.  ㄰
income tends to decrease the propensity to form currency unions, but raise the probability 
of pegs. A client is more likely to use the currency of an anchor country that has a larger 
population, but it is less likely to peg its currency to the currency of the more populous 
anchor country.  
From the estimated probabilities in the multinomial logit regressions, we use 
equation (1) to compute the probabilities that a pair of countries have their currencies 
pegged to the same currency as in the form of either currency union or peg.  
These probabilities are used as instrument variables for the currency union, or peg 
dummy variable in the regressions. 
 
  4. The Effects of Exchange Rate Regimes on Trade   
 
We set up a conventional gravity model of international trade. We adopt Glick 
and Rose (2002) for the empirical specification. The dependent variable is the logarithm 
of bilateral trade. The various measures of size and distance are added as control 
variables that are standard in the gravity equation. We extend the model by adding two 
dummy variables for pegged exchange rate regimes—currency union and peg. The 
regression uses annual data for 186 countries from 1974 to 1997.  
The data set has a feature of panel structure. We apply two different estimation 
techniques: random effects and fixed effects. We also control for year effects by adding 
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where i and j denote countries, t denotes time, Tradeijt denotes the average value of real 
bilateral trade between i and j at time t, GDP is real GDP, Pop is Population, Dist is the 
distance between i and j, Area is the land mass of the country, Border is a binary variable 
which is unity if i and j share a land border, Language is a binary variable which is unity ㄱ
if i and j have a common language, Landlock is the number of landlocked countries in the 
country-pair (0, 1, or 2), Island is the number of island nations in the pair ((0, 1, or 2), 
ExComColony is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 
with the same colonizer, ExColony is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j 
or vice versa, CurColony is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are colonies at time 
t, CuUnion is a binary variable which is unity if i and j join a currency union at time t, 
Peg  is a binary variable which is unity if i and j peg their currencies to a same anchor 
currency at time t,  and Year denotes a set of binary variables which are unity in the 
specific year t.  
Table 2, columns (1) and (2), presents the estimation results for the whole sample 
including pairs containing the anchor countries.  Column 1 shows the results from the 
random effects estimation. The gravity model fits the data well, explaining a major part 
of the variation in bilateral trade flows. As predicted by the model, log of GDP in pair, 
log of per capita GDP in pair, common land border dummy, common language dummy, 
islands dummy, ex-common colonizer dummy, current-colony-colonizer dummy, and ex-
colony-colonizer dummy all turn out to have positive relationship with the volume of 
trade between two countries. The estimated coefficients on all explanatory variables 
except islands dummy and current colony dummy are statistically significant at the 
conventional 5% level. Bilateral distance, log of area in pair, and land locked dummy 
enter significantly negatively.  
Our primary interest is in the impact of exchange rate pegs on bilateral trade 
volume. The estimated coefficient on the currency union dummy variable is positive and 
statistically significant.  The estimate (0.485, s.e.=0.110) implies that a pair of countries 
that belong to a same currency union tends to trade more by about 62 percent than a 
random pair of countries with a floating exchange rate arrangement, holding other things 
constant.
18 The estimated coefficient on the peg dummy variable is also positive and 
statistically significant (0.134, s.e.=0.016). The estimated effects of these pegging 
arrangements on bilateral trade become smaller than that of currency unions: a pair of 
                                                 
18 Since e
0.485=1.624, joining a currency union, which implies an increase from 0 (no currency union) to 1, 
raises bilateral trade by about 62%. This estimate is far smaller than the number found by the seminal Rose 
(2000) paper, which is based on cross-section data, but close to the panel estimate reported by Glick and 
Rose (2002) . 
 ㄲ
pegging countries tends to trade more by about 14 percent than a random pair of floating 
countries.  
Column 2 of Table 2 presents the fixed effect “within” estimates.  This method 
can provide more consistent estimates by controlling for the influences from unobserved 
country-specific factors. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) shows that the 
typical gravity model does not incorporate the ‘relative distance effect’, i.e. the likelihood 
that more distant a country pair is located from the world market, they trade more than 
otherwise. The fixed-effect estimation can provide consistent-estimates by controlling for 
the missing (time-invariant) relative distance term. In addition, this estimate from time-
series variation is useful in answering the question of “what would happen to two 
countries’ trade after they peg their currencies to a same anchor currency?” One 
drawback of this fixed-effect approach is that since the fixed effect estimator exploits 
variation over time, we cannot obtain the estimates for time-invariant factors such as 
distance, area, land border, and ex-colonial relationship.  
The estimation result in column 2 is in general similar to that of the random-
effects estimation in column 1. The estimated coefficient of the currency union variable is 
slightly reduced in magnitude (0.339, s.e.= 0.126), which implies joining a currency 
union raises bilateral trade by 40%. On the contrary, the fixed effects estimate of the peg 
variable (0.162, s.e.= 0.016) is slightly larger in magnitude than the random effects 
estimate. 
Table 2, columns (3) and (4), reports the same estimation results for the sample 
exclusive of the anchor countries.   The estimation results are remarkably similar. The 
estimated coefficients of the currency union and the peg dummy are all statistically 
significant at 1 percent. 
19 As emphasized, the estimation results are less vulnerable to the 
endogeneity problem.  
In sum, the empirical results show that after two countries peg their currencies to 
a same anchor currency, their bilateral trade increases considerably. The empirical results 
                                                 
19 This result contrasts to the finding by Klein and Shambaugh (2004) in which the ‘indirect’ fixed 
exchange rate arrangements between the client countries pegging to a common anchor do not have a 
significant effect on bilateral trade, whereas the ‘direct’ peg regimes between the anchor and the client 
countries have a significantly positive effect on trade. The interpretation of their finding is, however, not 
clear because their specification controls for the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade separately and 
thereby ignores the possible effect of peg regime on trade through lowering exchange rate volatility.  ㄳ
imply that low exchange rate variability between two countries with pegged exchange 
rate arrangements helps them trade more. Currency union, the strictest form of peg, has 
the largest trade-creation effect. 
In order to control for endogeneity bias, we also implement the IV regressions. 
The instruments are generated by the probability that two countries share a common 
anchor currency estimated from the multilogit regression, as explained in Section 3.The 
results of IV regressions is shown in columns (5) and (6) in Table 2, which can be 
compared to the OLS results in columns (1) and (2) in Table 2. The IV regression results 
in columns (5) and (6) confirm the OLS estimation results that both the currency unions 
and pegged exchange rate arrangements increase bilateral trade significantly. Hence, the 
positive effects of pegged regimes on trade in OLS estimation do not reflect the reverse 
causality that runs from trade to the choice of pegged regimes, or the influence of any 
omitted characteristics. In the instrument-variable estimation, the estimated coefficients 
on currency union and pegged regime dummy variables go up substantially. The random-
effect IV estimates are 1.481 (s.e.=0.716) and 0.845 (s.e.=0.228) for currency unions and 
pegged regime respectively. The estimates become even larger in the fixed-effect IV 
estimation. The larger IV estimates for the effect of currency unions on bilateral trade are 
consistent with Tenreyro and Barro (2003). They offer possible explanations of the 
underestimation bias with OLS. For example, economies with higher degrees of 
monopoly distortions tend to have smaller trade, while they more likely join currency 
unions to eliminate the inflation bias generating from the high distortion.  
 
  5. The Effects of Exchange Rate Regimes on Output and Consumption Co-
movements    
 
  By altering the exchange rate regime, the business cycle dynamics of output and 
consumption are also affected.  Especially we will investigate how the choice of the 
exchange rate regime influences co-movements of output and consumption across 
countries.  In the literature at least three distinct channels have been emphasized through 
which the exchange rate regime influences output and consumption co-movements.  First, 
as shown in the previous section, if trade integration can be enhanced by currency union ㄴ
or the peg regime, this can also affect output co-movement.  It is, however, ambiguous if 
more trade would increase or decrease the extent of output co-movement.  The positive 
spillover effect of aggregate demand shocks through trade tends to make business cycles 
more correlated across countries. Deeper trade integration can also stimulate the spread of 
technology shocks internationally, contributing positive co-movement.  On the other hand, 
as Eichengreen (1992), Kenen (1969) and Krugman (1993) argued, an increase in trade 
linkages may encourage greater specialization of production, resulting in less 
synchronization of business cycles.  However, Frankel and Rose (1998) and Shin and 
Wang (2004) countered the above argument, insisting that if intra-industry trade was 
more pronounced than inter-industry trade, business cycles would become more 
positively correlated as trade integration strengthens.  While the theoretical predictions 
are varied and conflicting to each other, most empirical studies find that business cycles 
are more synchronized as trade integration deepens.   
  Second, reduced currency risk due to strict exchange rate regimes such as 
currency union may lead to enhanced  financial integration, affecting business cycles co-
movement as well.   As suggested by Kalemli-Ozcam, Sorensen and Yosha (2001), better 
income insurance attained through greater capital market integration may induce higher 
specialization of production and hence larger asymmetric shocks across countries.  
Through this channel the extent of output co-movement is lowered.  Due to increased risk 
sharing, however, consumption co-movement may increase or at least not decrease as 
much as output co-movement does.  As argued by Imbs (2004), however, if capital flows 
are correlated internationally, financial integration may synchronize output co-movement.  
  Third, with a tightly integrated capital market, if a country adopts a hard peg 
regime, autonomy of monetary policy is forsaken and hence monetary policy shocks 
become common to member countries.
20 This will contribute to greater co-movement of 
output.  However, arguments may run in the opposite direction.  That is, since 
idiosyncratic internal shocks are not dampened by independent monetary policy and 
external shocks are transmitted across countries without being mitigated by exchange rate 
movements, outputs can move in more asymmetric way with a pegged regime. 
                                                 
20 Shambaugh (2004) show that pegged countries move interest rates more closely with anchor country’s 
interest rates than nonpegs do. ㄵ
In sum theoretical predictions on the influence of the exchange rate regime on 
output and consumption co-movements are varied and conflicting to each other.  
However, the fact that patterns of business cycle co-movement alter after adopting a 
particular exchange regime alarms the traditional approach to gauge the choice of 
exchange regimes based on past data.  This is what Frankel and Rose (1998) emphasized 
as the endogenous nature of a decision to join a monetary union.  In other words, since 
the economic structure is likely to change as a result of a monetary union, even a country 
that is not eligible for entry into a monetary union ex ante can justify its decision ex post  
after adopting a monetary union.  Hence it is crucially important to understand in advance 
how the patterns of co-movement vary under the various exchange rate regimes. 
  To compute output co-movement, we follow a similar approach to Alesina, Barro 
and Tenreyro (2002) and Tenreyro and Barro (2003).  Relative output movements 
between countries i and j are measured by subtracting output growth for country j from 
that for country i:  ln( ) ln( ) it jt YY ∆− ∆.  Then for every pair of countries, (i, j), we compute 
the second-order auto-regression of the annual time series for each country: 
 
  01 1 1 2 2 2 ln( ) ln( ) ( ln( ) ln( )) ( ln( ) ln( ))
Y
it jt it jt it jt ijt YY c c Y Y c Y Y u −− −− ∆ −∆ = + ∆ −∆ + ∆ −∆ +  (3) 
 
The estimated residual,  ijt u , measures the part of the relative output movements that 
could not be predicted from the two prior values of relative output movements. The 
extent of output co-movement at each point of time is then measured as the negative of 




ijt ijt CoY u =− ×          ( 4 )  
 
The extent of co-movement for the entire sample period is also measured by the negative 
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While most other approaches rely on a simple correlation of output to measure co-
movement, Alesina et al. claim that this measure of co-movement is more relevant from 
the perspective of monetary policy and the choice of the exchange rate regimes.  The 
reason is because output movements can be highly correlated to each other despite 
substantially different variabilities across countries. In this case, the monetary policy 
response desired for a low variability country will be insufficient for a high variability 
country.  Thus a higher correlation, for example, does not warrant that two countries can 
peg the exchange rate to each other and share the same monetary policy. 
  To investigate the determinants of output co-movement, we employ the same 
control variables used for the gravity equation for trade.
21 To identify the impact of the 
exchange rate regimes, we also add the three dummy variables of the exchange rate 
regimes as regressors.  We employ two types of estimation based on the panel regression 
and cross-section regression respectively.  The first type of equation for the panel 




ijt ijt t ijt
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CuUnion HardPeg SofPeg YEAR γ γγ δ ε
=
++ ++ +
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ij ij ij ij
Co Y SE Meanof OtherControlVariables
CuUninon HardPeg SoftPeg γ γγ ε
=
+++ +
   (7) 
 
                                                 
21 While the theoretical basis for the gravity equation in explaining trade flows is well documented, to our 
knowledge, there is no theoretical justification in using the gravity equation to explain either output or 
consumption co-movement, and it is at best considered as a reduced form equation.  Therefore, to verify the 
role of the exchange rate regimes, it is important to develop the instrumental variables for them. ㄷ
where  ij CuUninon ,  ij HardPeg  and  ij SoftPeg  are the average of each dummy variable for 
the entire sample. 
Despite the similarity with the approach made by Alesina et al., there are two 
main differences between our approach and theirs.  First, they measure the relative output 
movements based on the level instead of the growth rate. While their measure captures 
both temporary and permanent components of output movements, they need the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate to compare the levels of output across 
countries.  Our measure instead relies on real output at the constant local currency unit 
that requires information about neither the official exchange rate nor the PPP exchange 
rate.  However, by using the growth rate, the temporary movements of output are 
eliminated.  Second, by focusing solely on equation (7), Alesina et al. are based on cross-
section regression only.  However we also utilize information in (6) at each time of the 
period, and hence can also adopt a panel regression approach, which allows us to 
eliminate unobserved country specific effects. 
  The estimated results for the whole sample including the anchor countries are 
reported in table 3.   Since regression results with fixed-effects are similar, column 1 
reports regression results with random effects only.  The cross-section regression results 
are reported in column 2.  In both regressions, the sign of the coefficient of the log 
distance is unexpectedly positive and statistically significant.  On the other hand, the 
other coefficients lead to interesting interpretations.  In both regressions, the higher the 
log of aggregate or per capita GDP in pair, the greater is output co-movement between 
pairs.  This suggests that higher income countries tend to have higher co-movement of 
output.  Interestingly, however, the log of area in pair has a negative impact on the extent 
of output co-movement.  Further, the fact that the pair countries are colonized by a 
common country leads to lower output co-movement.  The coefficients of other colony 
dummy variables are not statistically significant at 5 %.  The RTA dummy variable also 
contributes to higher co-movement of output. 
Our main concern is about the impact of exchange rate regimes on output co-
movement. The estimated coefficient on the currency union dummy variable is not 
statistically significant.  This suggests that, unlike the case for trade, currency union does 
not lead to higher output co-movement.  On the other hand, the coefficient of the peg ㄸ
dummy variable is positive and statistically significant in both regressions.  Overall our 
regression results suggest that only the peg regime has a strong evidence of enhancing 
output co-movement. 
    Table 4, columns (3) and (4), also reports the regression results for the same 
equations using the sample exclusive of the anchor countries.  Generally we find very 
consistent results as we find in columns (1) and (2).  The estimated coefficients of other 
control variables are remarkably similar to the results for the sample including the 
anchor countries.  The estimated coefficient on the currency union dummy variable is 
not statistically significant and even negative in the random effects regression.  On the 
other hand the coefficient of the peg regime is positive and highly significant.   
    The columns (5) and (6) report the IV regression results.  The IV regression 
results are distinctive from the OLS results in a number of aspects.  First, the coefficient 
of log of distance is no longer significant.  Second, the coefficient of log of area is less 
significant and shows the opposite sign in the cross section equation. Last and most 
importantly, while the coefficient of the pegged dummy is still positive and significant, 
the coefficient of the currency union dummy is negative and highly significant.   
Overall our results suggest that only the peg regime contributes to higher co-
movement of output and that the currency union, the strictest form of pegging, does not.  
The IV regression results suggest that the currency union makes output co-movement 
even lower.   Since increased trade has been found to strengthen output co-movement in a 
number of empirical studies, the fact that the currency union that boosts trade most does 
not contribute to higher output co-movement looks puzzling.  To shed light on this issue 
further, Table 4 reports additional regression results for the equation where, instead of all 
explanatory variables for the gravity equation of trade, we put the bilateral trade directly 
as a regressor.  Again all the six regression results are reported in columns (1)-(6). As 
expected, the coefficient of trade is positive and highly significant.  Interestingly the RTA 
dummy, after controlling trade, has no explanatory power except for one case.  However 
the coefficient of the currency union dummy is negative and statistically very significant. 
On the other hand, the coefficient of the peg regime is positive and statistically very 
significant.   ㄹ
Our results strongly suggest that there exist other channels, in addition to an 
increase in bilateral trade, by which the currency union regime affects on output co-
movement.  As suggested at the beginning of this section, if currency union particularly 
leads to higher risk sharing through financial integration, the currency union regime, after 
controlling the trade effect, may lead to lower output co-movement by encouraging 
higher specialization in industries.  The significantly positive coefficient of the peg 
regime also implies that, besides the trade channel, the peg regime influences output co-
movement by additional channels which induce even more synchronization of business 
cycle across countries. For example, it is possible that the peg regime leads to more 
output co-movement due to common monetary shocks.
22 As explained, interest rates tend 
to move closely among the countries with hard peg exchange rate regimes.  
  While the above interpretation is suggestive, the argument on risk sharing is 
verified only after we compare the extent of output co-movement with that of 
consumption co-movement.   We measure the extent of consumption co-movement in a 
similar way.   That is, we calculate the relative consumption movement between countries 
i and j by subtracting consumption growth for country j from that for country i: 
ln( ) ln( ) it jt CC ∆− ∆.  Then we estimate the second order auto-regressive equation to 
generate the estimated residual series, 
C
ijt u . The extent of consumption co-movement at 
each point of time is then measured as the negative of the absolute value of the estimated 




ijt ijt CoC u =− ×       ( 8 )  
 
The extent of consumption co-movement for the entire sample period is also measured by 
the negative of the root-mean-squared error multiplied by 100: 
 
                                                 
22 The monetary shocks are even more synchronized under currency union.  However, this effect seems to 
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To investigate how the exchange rate regimes influence the extent of consumption 
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The regression results for the whole sample including the anchor countries are 
reported in Table 5.   Again since regression results with fixed-effects are similar, we 
report only the regression results with random effects in column (1).  The cross-section 
regression results are also reported in the next column.  We also report the regression 
results for the sample excluding the anchor countries in columns (3) and (4), Table 5.   
These regression results are remarkably consistent with each other.  In all the regressions, 
unlike the case for output co-movement, the sign of the coefficient of the log distance is 
negative but statistically insignificant.  The coefficients of other control variables, 
however, have generally the same sign.  In all the regressions, the higher the log of 
aggregate or per capita GDP in pair, the greater is consumption co-movement between 
pairs.  The log of area in pair has again a negative impact on the extent of consumption 
co-movement.  Further, the fact that the pair countries are colonized by a common 
country leads to lower consumption co-movement.  There is also a weak evidence that the 
ex-colony-colonizer relationship and the RTA lead to lower consumption co-movement.   
Our main focus is on the impact of exchange rate regimes on consumption co-
movement.  An important result is that, unlike the case of output co-movement, the OLS ㈱
regression results in columns (1)-(4), whether of all sample or of sample exclusive of 
anchor countries, show that the estimated coefficient of the currency union dummy 
variable is positive and statistically significant even at 1 percent level.  This suggests that, 
unlike the case for output co-movement, currency union does lead to higher consumption 
co-movement.  The coefficient of the peg dummy variable is also positive and 
statistically significant in all the regressions.  Comparing the output co-movement 
regression results the extent of consumption co-movement is enhanced in a similar 
magnitude. 
  Generally if output co-movement increases, we can also expect that consumption 
co-movement increases as well. This happens, for example, even in the extreme case of 
autonomous economies where each country consumes its own output.  Risk sharing is 
enhanced only when the extent of consumption co-movement is even more strengthened 
than that of output co-movement.
23   In this regard, only currency union shows evidence 
of enhanced risk sharing.  Under currency union, even if output co-movement may get 
lowered due to possible specialization of output, consumption co-movement gets stronger, 
which is interpreted as strong evidence of risk sharing.  Under the peg regime, while 
consumption co-movement increases, the extent of the increase in consumption co-
movement is more or less similar to that for output co-movement, thereby providing little 
evidence of enhanced risk sharing.  
  In columns (5) and (6), Table 5, we also report the IV regression results.  
Generally the coefficients of other control variables are estimated very consistently with 
those in the OLS estimation.  However the coefficient of the RTA dummy is negative and 
statistically significant.  In addition, the coefficient of the currency union dummy changes 
the sign and becomes insignificant.  However, if we just compare the IV regression 
results across output and consumption co-movements, while the coefficient of the 
currency union dummy in the output co-movement regression is negative and statistically 
significant, the coefficient of the currency union dummy in the consumption co-
movement regression is negative but statistically insignificant.  In other words, while 
output co-movement gets lowered, there is no statistically significant evidence that 
                                                 
23 This simple approach of comparing output co-movement with consumption co-movement to measure the 
degree of risk sharing has been widely adopted in the literature.  For example, see Backus , Keho and 
Kydland (1992) for international risk sharing and Hess and Shin (1998) for intranational risk sharing. ㈲
consumption co-movement is also lowered under the currency union regime.  We 
interpret this as evidence of risk sharing under currency union because consumption co-
movement is not aggravated as much as output co-movement is.  On the other hand, the 
evidence on the peg regime is mixed.  Comparing to the estimates in Table 3 for output 
co-movement, the coefficient of the peg regime dummy is higher in the random effects 
estimation, but it is lower in the cross section estimation.  Hence, unlike in the currency 
union regime, there is no strong evidence that the peg regime enhances consumption co-





We have investigated how the exchange rate regime influences economic linkages 
across countries.  We divide the exchange rate regime into three classifications: currency 
union, peg and floating exchange rates. Unlike most studies solely focusing on the 
relationship between anchor and client countries, the exchange rate regime between any 
two countries is inferred based on their relationship to the common anchor currency. 
Then we empirically explore how the various exchange rate regimes impact on bilateral 
trade, output co-movement and financial integration.  Financial integration is measured 
by the degree of risk sharing reflected in consumption co-movement relative to output co-
movement.   
We find that, while currency union has the greatest effect, the peg regime also 
significantly boosts trade.  We also find that, while the peg regime contributes to both 
output and consumption co-movements, the currency union strengthens only 
consumption co-movement and possibly lowers output co-movement.  These findings are 
interpreted that the currency union, the strictest form of pegged regimes, leads to higher 
industry specialization and better risk sharing opportunities than the less strict peg regime.  
  Our findings suggest that the choice of exchange rate regimes significantly 
influences economic linkages across countries.  It is an intriguing question why the 
currency union and the peg regimes show some similarities and differences as well.  We 
conjecture that the strong commitment reflected in the currency union plays a role in ㈳
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
(a) Whole Sample (N=119,677): 1974-1997 
 
 Mean  Std.  Dev
Log of trade  10.129   3.488  
Log of distance  8.235   .775  
Log of GDP in pairs  48.304       2.651  
Log of per capita GDP in pairs  16.311       1.410  
Log of area in pairs  24.122   3.213  
Common land border dummy  .023   .149  
Common language dummy  .202       .402  
Landlocked dummy  .248  .467
Island dummy  .362  .547
Ex-common colonizer dummy  .085     .278  
Ex-colony-colonizer dummy  .020     .140  
Current colony dummy  .0004       .021  
Regional trade agreement dummy  .016  .127
Currency Union dummy  .009       .093  
Soft Peg dummy  .160       .366  
 
Notes: This sample includes all country pairings from 1974to 1997.  
 ㈸
(b) Sample without anchor countries (N.=87,644): 1974-1997 
 
 Mean  Std.  Dev
Log of trade  9.718   3.353  
Log of distance  8.235   .784  
Log of GDP in pairs  47.985       2.516  
Log of per capita GDP in pairs  16.205       1.403  
Log of area in pairs  23.962   3.230  
Common land border dummy  .023   .151  
Common language dummy  .197       .398  
Landlocked dummy  .260  .477
Island dummy  .381  .560
Ex-common colonizer dummy  .095     .294  
Ex-colony-colonizer dummy  .007     .084  
Current colony dummy  .0001       .007  
Regional trade agreement dummy  .015  .120
Currency Union dummy  .009       .094  
Soft Peg dummy  .161       .367  
 
Notes: This sample includes all country pairings from 1974 to 1997 that exclude pairs containing 
one of the five anchors considered in the study. 
 ㈹
 Table 2: Effects of Exchange Regimes on Trade Flows 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















Log of distance  -1.378** 
(0.030)  --  -1.395** 
(0.031)  --  -1.344** 
(0.028)   












Log of per capita 













Log of area in pair  -0.114** 
(0.010)  --  -0.120** 
(0.011)  --  -0.1138** 
(0.010)   
Common language  0.372** 
(0.060)  --  0.323** 
(0.064)  --  0.280** 




(0.153)  --  0.711** 
(0.161)  --  0.542** 
(0.136)   
Landlocked  -0.373** 
(0.042)  --  -0.328** 
(0.043)  --  -0.335** 
(0.037)   
Islands  0.056 
(0.048)  --  0.040 
(0.050)  --  0.065 




(0.079)  --  0.336** 
(0.082)  --  0.229** 




(0.185)  --  1.608** 
(0.316)  --  1.866** 
(0.162)   


















































No.  Observations  119,677 119,677 106,165 106,165 119,677 119,677 
R-squared  0.662 0.562 0.614 0.499 0.513 0.513 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of real bilateral trade. In columns (1) and (2), the panel data 
estimation techniques are applied to all samples of annual observations over the period from 1974 to 1997. 
Columns (3) and (4) are based on the sample that excludes the five potential anchor countries: France, 
Germany, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The panel IV estimation techniques 
are applied to columns (5) and (6).  Intercept and year dummy variables are included (not reported). Robust 
standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses.  ** and * indicate that the 
estimated coefficients is statistically significant at 1 % and 5 % respectively. ㌰
 Table 3: Effects of Exchange Regimes on Business Cycle Co-movements 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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No.  Observations  91,431 91,431 73,813 73,813 80,820 80,820 
R-squared  0.07 0.31 0.06 0.30 0.05 0.30 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a measure of output co-movement explained the main text. The panel data 
estimation techniques are applied to the entire sample of 91,431 observations in 4,592 country-pair groups 
over the period from 1974 to 1997. See also the notes to table 2.   
 
 ㌱
Table 4: Effects of Trade and Exchange Regimes on Business Cycle Co-movements 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 

































































No.  Observations  91,431 91,431 73,813 73,813 80,820 80,820 
R-squared  0.04 0.23 0.04 0.22 0.05 0.04 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a measure of output co-movement explained the main text. The panel data 
estimation techniques are applied to the entire sample of 91,431 observations in 4,592 country-pair groups 
over the period from 1974 to 1997. See also the notes to table 2.   
 ㌲
Table 5: Effects of Exchange Regimes on Consumption Co-movements 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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No.  Observations  83,557 83,557 71,322 71,322 74,891 74,891 
R-squared  0.07 0.30 0.06 0.29 0.04 0.10 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a measure of consumption co-movement explained the main text. The 
panel data estimation techniques are applied to the entire sample of 91,431 observations in 4,592 country-
pair groups over the period from 1974 to 1997.  See also the notes to table 2.  
 
 ㌳
 Appendix Table: Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Propensity of Adopting the 






Log distance  -4.957**  -1.767** 
 (1.128)  (0.265) 
Common land border  -4.483**  -0.773 
 (1.557)  (0.677) 
Common language  0.828  1.305** 
 (1.723)  (0.409) 
Ex-colony-colonizer 6.315** 2.014** 
 (2.238)  (0.483) 
Regional trade agreement  4.102**  1.831** 
 (0.721)  (0.558) 
Log of anchor’s GDP per capita  14.11  12.78** 
 (8.68)  (1.78) 
Log of anchor’s population  21.41**  -4.154** 
 (7.72)  (1.111) 
Log of anchor’s area  -5.775  1.696** 
 (3.317)  (0.435) 
Log of client’s GDP per capita  -0.436  0.182* 
 (0.237)  (0.092) 
Log of client’s population  -0.649  -0.012 
 (0.381)  (0.147) 
Log of client’s area  0.416  -0.167 
 (0.221)  (0.102) 
Number of Observations  17,092 
Pseudo R
2  0.397 
 
Note: the sample consists of country-pairs that include five potential anchors: France. Germany, South 
Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States.  The estimation is for annual data over the period from 
1974 to 1997, and allows for clustering over time for country pairs. Intercept and year dummy variables are 
included (not reported). ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficients is statistically significant at 1 % 
and 5 % respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 